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INTRODUCTION
This Article reassesses the Turkey-European Union trade
relationship in light of the doctrine of promissory estoppel and the
history of Turkish accession to the European Union. It argues that the
Court of First Instance (CFI) and the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) in Yedaş Tarim should have used more explicitly the doctrine
of promissory estoppel as an equitable devise to create liability for
the potential detriment suffered by Turkey in relying on the promises
made by Brussels. Part I provides a short overview of TurkeyEuropean Union relations from the early 1950s until today, with
particular attention to accession negotiations and the trade
relationship between Turkey and The European Economic
Community. Turkey’s 1987 application for European Community
(EC) membership began a tortuous path for the aspiring new member
marked by Turkey’s efforts to meet the European criteria for
accession. In 1995 Turkey became the first member of the European
Community Customs Union without being at the same time an
official candidate for accession.1 This anomalous situation is central
to this Article’s claims about the unbalanced Turkey-European
Union trade relationship. Turkey was compelled to make serious
political, economic and administrative reforms to work towards E.U.
membership. The failure of those reforms to bring about concrete
progress towards accession began to foster Turkish government and
public distrust of Brussels.
In 1999, The European Council finally decided that Turkey would
be officially considered a candidate of accession after Greece lifted
its veto on the Turkish candidacy.2 As of 2008, the Commission’s
latest progress report shows modest improvements in the country’s
economic and democratic institutions, but it nevertheless continues

1. See Meltem Müftüler-Bac & Lauren M. McLaren, Enlargement
Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey, 25 J.
EUR. INTEGRATION 17, 20 (2003) (noting that Turkey is the only country to have
concluded a customs union prior to full EU membership).
2. See Patrick R. Hugg, Cyprus in Europe: Seizing the Momentum of Nice, 34
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1293, 1328 (2001) (explaining that the rapprochement
between Turkey and Greece ultimately led to both Cyprus and Turkey becoming
candidates for accession).
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the ongoing negotiation process.3 Turkey’s difficulties in navigating
the accession process over twenty years has created a backlash
among Turkish political and legal elites who question whether
accession is even worth pursuing. While many factors have
contributed to this backlash, a primary cause is the increasingly
unbalanced trade relationship between the European Union and
Turkey. While the European Union imposes unilateral obligations on
Turkey and has largely benefited from the Customs Union, Turkey
has suffered economic losses as a result of efforts to comply with
trade and legal obligations mandated by Brussels, and Turkey
receives little of the financial help that the European Union normally
grants to its future members.4 Not surprisingly, Brussels’ behavior
has engendered a deep frustration among the Turkish political and
legal elites by not living up to its promise of strengthening both sides
of the trade relationship.
Part II analyses the Yedaş Tarim decisions by the CFI and ECJ in
order to show the Turkish legal elites’ frustration with the
unbalanced Turkey-European Union trade relationship. This part
focuses on the doctrine of promissory estoppel, developed in
common law jurisdictions and more broadly adopted in international
law. In promissory estoppel cases, a party invokes the equitable
enforcement of a promise that was technically not fully binding and
yet induced the claimant’s detrimental reliance. The doctrine of
promissory estoppel entitles the claimant to damages for the
detriment suffered. Yedaş Tarim, the applicant before the Court of
First Instance (CFI), invoked a number of unfulfilled promises that
the European Union made to Turkey in the aftermath of the Ankara
Association Agreement and that over time have worsened rather than
strengthened the Turkish balance of trade.5 Nevertheless, in this case

3. See generally Turkey 2008 Progress Report Accompanying the
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009, COM (2208) 674
final (Nov. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Turkey 2008 Progress Report] (acknowledging
Turkey’s improvement in certain areas but noting deficiencies in the
implementation of democratic and political reforms).
4. See infra Part III.1 (discussing hardships imposed on Turkey by the
imbalanced Turkey-EU trade relationships).
5. See, e.g., Case T-367/03, Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ
v. Council of the European Union, 2006 E.C.R. II-873, ¶¶ 36, 47.
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the Court found no detriment for the claimant and no liability for the
European Union.6
Part III places Yedaş Tarim in the broader context of the existing
trade relation between Turkey and the European Union created by
the Ankara Association Agreement in 1963 and its subsequent
protocol. The obligations undertaken by Turkey vis à vis the free
movement of workers and services in the common market and vis à
vis the E.U. foreign commercial policy have created certain
economic patterns, such as the migration of Turkish workers and
their families. Moreover, Turkey’s obligations have prompted new
disputes in which Turkey became a defendant before the World
Trade Organization (WTO) for infringing its multilateral
obligations.7 This Article questions the reasoning of the European
courts in Yedaş Tarim through a broader understanding of the
anomalous and unbalanced trade relationship between Turkey and
the European Union.

I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TURKEY AND
THE EUROPEAN UNION SINCE THE 1950S
A. THE TORTUOUS PATH FROM ANKARA TO BRUSSELS
After entering the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in
1952 and joining the Council of Europe in 1949, Turkey signed the
Ankara Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC)
in 1963. This Association Agreement was based on Article 238 of
the Treaty of Rome, which established that European countries with
stable democracies and market economies could seek accession to
become full members of the Community.8 Thus, the Ankara
Association Agreement represented a first step for Turkey towards a

6. See infra text accompanying notes 116-18 (detailing the Court’s holding in
Yedaş Tarim).
7. See Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and
Clothing Products, ¶¶ 2-3, WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter WTO
Appellate Body Report on Turkish Textiles] (describing India’s claim against
Turkey for imposing trade restrictions required by its agreement with the EU).
8. Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic
Community and Turkey, Sept. 1, 1963, 1964 O.J. (217) 3687 [hereinafter Ankara
Agreement].
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full membership in the EEC.9 The Ankara Agreement set in place a
three-step process which began with the establishment of a customs
union and a trade liberalization regime between Turkey and the
EEC.10
The three stages consisted of a preparatory phase, followed by a
transitional and a final phase during which the association between
Turkey and the EEC would create closer economic ties and facilitate
Turkish membership.11 During the preparatory stage, the EEC was
supposed to give financial aid to Turkey to strengthen its economy in
light of their future long-term relation.12 The creation of a Customs
Union was part of the final stage of the Ankara Agreement, which
was concluded in 1995 and implemented by 1996.13 The Ankara
Agreement also created some institutions such as the Council of
Association, with the task of monitoring, implementing, and
improving the exchange of information between the contracting
parties.14 In the 1970s an Additional Protocol to the Ankara
Agreement was signed to mark the end of a preparatory phase and
Turkey’s entrance into a transitional stage.15 The Additional Protocol
aimed to conclude the Customs Union between the parties, and the
EEC committed to providing financial assistance to Turkey by

9. See id. art. 28 (“As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced
far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations
arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall
examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community.”).
10. See id. art. 2 (outlining the agreement’s principles and specific steps to
Turkish economic and trade development); see also Meltem Müftüler-Baç, The
Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics, 34 E. EUR. Q. 159, 160-66
(2000) (reviewing Turkey’s compliance with the three steps required by the
Association Agreement).
11. Ankara Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 3, 4, 10.
12. See id. art. 3 (specifying that Turkey will fulfill its obligations during the
preparatory stage “with aid from the Community”).
13. Id. art. 4(2).
14. See id. arts. 6, 22-25, 27 (establishing the Council of Association and
delineating its functions).
15. See id. art. 3(2) (stating “[t]he change-over to the transitional stage shall be
effected in accordance with Article 1 of the Provisional Protocol”); Additional
Protocol and Financial Protocol Signed on 23 November 1970, Annexed to the
Agreement Establishing the Association Between the European Economic
Community and Turkey and on Measures to be Taken for their Entry into Force,
pmbl., 1972 O.J. (L 293) 4 [hereinafter Additional Protocol] (asserting “the
conditions have been established for passing from the preparatory stage to the
transitional stage”).
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several means including loans.16 Furthermore, the Additional
Protocol extended the protections of the four freedoms—goods,
services, capitals and workers—to Turkish citizens and aimed to
harmonize Turkish law with EEC directives.17
When Turkey officially applied for full membership in the
European Community in 1987, several other Mediterranean countries
had just joined.18 Rather than accepting the Turkish request, the
Commission deferred the negotiation for accession based on the fact
that the Turkish democracy was not stable yet.19 The Kurdish as well
as the Cypriot problems were still looming in foreign policy.20 But
what made the Turkish candidacy more daunting in the European
public opinion were the recurrent human rights violations together
with the economic “backwardness” of the country.21 Thus the

16. See Additional Protocol, supra note 15, at pmbl. (aiming for a “progressive
establishment of a customs union” between Turkey and the E.U.); Financial
Protocol Annexed to the Agreement Establishing the Association Between the
European Economic Community and Turkey, arts. 1-3, Nov. 23, 1970, 1972 O.J.
(L 293) 4 [hereinafter Financial Protocol] (setting out the process by which Turkey
may apply for financial aid from the EEC).
17. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 9
[hereinafter Treaty on European Union] (mandating progressive abolition of
restrictions on the free movement of goods, capital, workers, and services, thereby
opening European markets and creating a free trade regime); Additional Protocol,
supra note 15, tits. I-II (requiring progressive implementation of provisions for the
free movement of goods, persons, and services); see also Bahri Yilmaz, The
Relations of Turkey with the European Union: Candidate Forever? 2 (Ctr. for
European Studies, Working Paper No. 167, 2008), available at
http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/ docs/pdfs/CES_167.pdf (referring to
the freedom of trade, freedom of movement of labor, freedom of movement of
persons, and freedom of movement of capital as the “four freedoms”).
18. See EUROPA, 1980-1989: The Changing Face of Europe – The Fall of the
Berlin Wall, http://europa.ed/abc/history/1980-1989/index_en.htm (last visited
Mar. 25, 2009) (reporting that Greece joined the EC in 1981, followed by Spain
and Portugal in 1986).
19. Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the
Community. SEC (89) 2290 final, ¶¶ 10-11 (Dec. 17, 1989) [hereinafter Turkey’s
Request for Accession].
20. See id. ¶ 9 (finding Turkey deficient “in the human rights situation and in
respect for the identity of minorities”); see also Mehmet Ögütçü, Turkey’s Place in
the New Architecture of Europe: An Updated Assessment, Oct. 2008,
http://egemenlikulusundur.org/ustat/ulastra/ogutcu2IV.htm
(chronicling
the
negative European response to Turkey’s “Kurdish problem”).
21. See Manfred Nowak, Human Rights ‘Conditionality’ in Relation to Entry
to, and Full Participation in, the EU, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 687, 691-92
(Philip Alston et al. eds., 1999) (clarifying why since the 1980s the EU began
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European Community further delayed Turkey’s accession and
adopted instead the Matutes Package, geared to facilitate technical
and financial assistance and conclude the Customs Union in 1995.22
In 1997, during the European Council in Luxembourg, the European
Union made clear that Turkey would not be included among the
candidates to start the accession negotiations.23 Not surprisingly this
statement triggered an angry Turkish reaction.24 According to the
Copenhagen criteria established by the European Union in 1993,
Turkey did not fulfill the requirements to join liberal, western
democratic, and market regimes.25
These criteria, conditional to future membership, mandated that
E.U. applicants fulfill three different objectives. First, applicants
must have “stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of
law, respect for human rights, and the protection of minorities.”
Second, they must have a “functioning market economy.” Lastly,
they must be able “to take on the obligations of political, economic,
and monetary union.”26 The Copenhagen criteria also included
Agenda 2000, a document supporting E.U. eastward enlargement by
including the former ten Communist countries while excluding
Turkey from the list.27 Moreover, the Agenda recommended that
assuming the responsibility for promoting human rights as well as political
identities among its members); see also David Kennedy, Turning to Market
Democracy: A Tale of Two Architectures, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 382-85 (1991)
(explaining how in European legal consciousness the linking of democratic
practices to free trade regimes has been a successful strategy).
22. See HARUN ARIKAN, TURKEY AND THE EU: AN AWKWARD CANDIDATE FOR
EU MEMBERSHIP? 72-73 (2d ed. 2006) (“The Matutes Package provided the main
base for the EU to implement its containment policy for Turkey. In fact, the
instruments of the Package were suited well [to] the EU’s containment policy for
Turkey, designed to strengthen EU-Turkey relations, while delaying the possibility
of actual Turkish membership in the foreseeable future.”).
23. See Yilmaz, supra note 17, at 8-9 (noting that despite “the dawn of a new
era” with the end of 1997, Turkey would continue to maintain a special status and
not be a candidate for accession negotiation).
24. See Müftüler-Baç, supra note 10, at 162-63 (reporting on political and
public reactions in Turkey to the EU’s rejection, including Turkey’s accusing the
EU of “erecting a cultural Berlin Wall”).
25. See Christos Kassimeris & Lina Tsoumpanou, The Impact of the European
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on
Turkey’s EU Candidacy, 12 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 329, 334 (2008) (underscoring the
EU’s focus on Turkey’s shortcomings in the human rights arena).
26. See Ian Barnes & Pamela Barnes, Enlargement, in EUROPEAN UNION
POLITICS 421, 426 (Michelle Cini ed., 2007).
27. See Communication of the Commission, Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and
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Turkey should increase its human rights standards and create more
protections for different minority groups in its territory.28 The
recommendations of Agenda 2000 and the following rejection of
Turkish accession created a strong backlash among Turkish political
elites, who considered it a “slap in the face” from Brussels.29
Finally, during the Helsinki European Council in 1999, the
European Union recognized Turkey as a candidate for accession
similar to the Eastern European countries.30 Despite the little
improvement on the human rights front, the Helsinki summit
declared that “Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the Union
on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate
states.”31 The Commission Reports in 2000 and 2003, closely
monitoring the Turkish situation, cautioned the European Union on
the limited features of the Turkish democratic system. According to
the Commission, Turkey ought to deepen its pledges to democracy
and the rule of law through institutional reform.32
Wider Union, DOC 97/6, at 95 (July 15, 1997) [hereinafter Agenda 2000] (listing
Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania,
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Cyprus as enlargement candidates);
EUROPA, Activities of the European Union—Summaries of Legislation, Agenda
2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union, http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/
en/lvb/l60001.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) (declaring that the possibility of
absorbing the ten former Communist countries was “one of the major reasons for
the Agenda 2000 reforms”).
28. See Agenda 2000, supra note 27, at 56-57 (commending Turkey on its
customs union but noting that its political structure and pursuit of democracy have
not yet achieved sufficient improvements).
29. Kassimeris & Tsoumpanou, supra note 25, at 334.
30. See id. at 335; see also Treaty on European Union, supra note 17, tit. VII,
art. O (describing the accession procedure). Any European State may apply for
membership. Id. After a State’s submission of a formal application, the
Commission presents an opinion to the Council, which acts unanimously after
receiving assent by an absolute majority of the Parliament. Id.
31. Kassimeris & Tsoumpanou, supra note 25, at 335.
32. See COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2000 REGULAR REPORT
FROM THE COMMISSION ON TURKEY’S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION 12-14
(2000) [hereinafter 2000 REGULAR REPORT], available at http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2000/tu_en.pdf (asserting that although
Turkey has made efforts at reform, those efforts are not making sufficient
progress); COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2003 REGULAR REPORT
FROM THE COMMISSION ON TURKEY’S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION 43-45
(2003) [hereinafter Turkey Progress Report 2003], available at http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/rr_tk_final_en.pdf
(outlining
several advances but continuing to identify inconsistencies or lack of
implementation in the democratic systems and rule of law).
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In the meantime, from the 1980s until 2001 Turkey began
adopting a number of harmonization packages and technical
measures constituting the acquis communautaire (the cumulative law
of the European Union) with the hope of speeding up the application
process.33 In 2002, the Copenhagen European Council stated that it
would immediately start the negotiations with Turkey in 2004 if, on
the basis of a Commission’s report, the country fulfilled the
Copenhagen criteria.34 While the accession negotiations between the
European Union and Turkey started in October 2005, of the thirtyfive chapters of the acquis that were opened, only one was closed in
2006.35
Meanwhile, Olli Rehn, the Commissioner responsible for
Enlargement, stated that the negotiation process with Turkey was
likely to be “a long, difficult, and tortuous journey.”36 At this point,
on top of the foreign policy tensions with Cyprus and the explosive
Kurdish situation in part of the country, the Commission identified
several other problems likely to create serious impediments to the
Turkish accession.37 For instance, the government kept in place those
33. See Esin Örücü, Seven Packages towards Harmonisation with the
European Union, 10 EUR. PUB. L. 603, 603-07 (2004) (describing the seven
harmonization packages that make fundamental changes in crucial areas of law in
an attempt to move Turkey towards integration into the EU).
34. Presidency Conclusions of Copenhagen European Council (Dec. 2002),
¶ 19 [hereinafter 2002 Presidency Conclusions] (promising negotiations without
delay if Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen criteria).
35. See Commission of the European Communities, Turkey 2006 Progress
Report, at 4, COM (2006) 649 final (Nov. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Turkey 2006
Progress Report] (noting that negotiations on the science and research chapter
were provisionally closed).
36. See José Casanova, The Long, Difficult, and Tortuous Journey of Turkey
into Europe and the Dilemmas of European Civilization, 13 CONSTELLATIONS 234,
234 (2006) (attributing in part the difficulties with Turkey’s accession to the
“nativist anxieties over predominantly Muslim immigration”).
37. See Vedat Can Yeğinsü, Europe’s Janus-Faced Rights: Ankara Caught
between Brussels and Strasbourg 8-10 (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (identifying four categories of obstacles preventing Turkey’s
accession to the EU: “politically-motivated restrictions on personal and individual
liberties, political activity, and freedom of expression and association”; “legal and
administrative anachronisms resulting from structures in Turkey which have not
[kept] apace of global developments, in particular industrialisation and
urbanisation”; “serious political decay – corruption, weakness of civilian
institutions vis-à-vis the military, and general and endemic administrative
inefficiency”; and “cultural and religious issues with deep roots both within
Turkish society and, more specifically, the attitudes of local administrators”).
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restrictions imposed by the military regime of 1980-1983 on personal
and individual liberties, such as freedom of association and
expression.38 Another problematic issue was the “administrative
anachronism” pervading bureaucratic and judicial practices, often
under scrutiny for transparency and corruption problems.39 Finally,
the widespread fear that the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
will transform Turkey into a Muslim fundamentalist state is very
much alive in Europe.40 In this perspective, the resurgence of Laicité
(secularism) in France has delayed even further the prospects of
accession for Turkey.41 The long journey from Ankara to Brussels is
far from being over, and as a result, the backlash among the Turkish
public has turned the hope of westernizing and modernizing the
country into a deep disillusionment towards the entire E.U. accession
process.42
Recently, the 2008 Progress Report published by the European
Commission analyzed the Turkish situation in light of the political
and economic criteria for membership, and reviewed the Turkish
capacity to implement the E.U. secondary legislation and policies.43
The Progress Report clarifies the strategic importance of Turkey not
only to secure the E.U. energy policy, especially in light of the
strategic role that Turkey played during the Russia-Georgia crisis,
but also to secure European borders and prevent conflicts.44
38. ERGON ÖZBUDUN, CONTEMPORARY TURKISH POLITICS: CHALLENGES TO
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 119-20 (2000) (describing a situation where,
although it has relinquished its formal powers, the military still wields considerable
power over domestic affairs).
39. Yeğinsü, supra note 30, at 9-10.
40. See Casanova, supra note 36, at 240 (arguing that despite European
prejudices, Turkey’s current representative democracy evidences its readiness to
join the EU).
41. See C.D. Lovejoy, Comment, A Glimpse into the Future: What Şahin v.
Turkey Means to France’s Ban on Ostensibly Religious Symbols in Public Schools,
24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 661, 683-84 (2006) (describing how Islamic beliefs can be at
odds with the French concept of secularism, particularly in the context of France’s
headscarf ban).
42. See Vincent Boland, The Feeling is Mutual: Why Turks are Growing
Disillusioned with Europe, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2007, at 13 (observing that Turkish
support for EU membership has declined from over 67% to about 35%); cf.
Europeanisation of Turkish Democracy?, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Oct. 6, 2003
(explaining that despite disillusionment by the Turkish public, the country
continues to undergo reforms in an attempt to achieve accession negotiations).
43. See generally Turkey 2008 Progress Report, supra note 3.
44. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
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Despite the current financial crises, the Progress Report highlights
the increasing economic interdependence between the European
Union and Turkey and the solidity of the Turkish economy.45 The
Report acknowledges some shortcomings in the realm of the
economic criteria for the accession, but overall it states that “Turkey
is a functioning market economy. It should be able to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the
medium term, provided it implements its comprehensive reform
programme in order to address structural weaknesses.”46 In assessing
the economic criteria for membership, the Commission
acknowledges that Turkey has made important progress in those
areas relevant to accession, such as the regulation of free movement
of goods, intellectual property rights, anti-trust policy, energy,
enterprise and industrial policy, and consumer protection.47
However, the Progress Report points to the recent political
tensions between the Turkish Constitutional Court and the ruling
Turkish party by suggesting that: “[A] new impetus now needs to be
given to reform, in order to strengthen democracy and human rights,
to modernize and develop the country and to bring it closer to the
[European Union].”48 Human rights, the protection of minorities, and
women’s rights appear to be some of the most controversial issues on
which the Commission argues that Turkey has made limited
progress.49 With respect to human rights and the protection of
minorities, the Commission affirms that Turkey needs a more
Parliament: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009, at 2, COM
(2008) 674 final (Nov. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Enlargement Strategy 2008-09]
(stating that “Turkey’s strategic importance to the EU has further increased in key
areas such as energy security, conflict prevention and resolution and regional
security in the Southern Caucasus and the Middle East”).
45. Id. at 6 (acknowledging that “Turkey is now a functioning market economy
in terms of the Copenhagen economic criteria”).
46. Id. at 63.
47. See id. at 64-65 (illustrating that despite some progress in economic and
monetary policy, Turkey must continue to confront several shortcomings vis-à-vis
the “full independence of the central bank, the monetary financing of the public
sector and privileged access by the public sector to financial markets.”).
48. Id. at 5.
49. Id. at 61-62 (explaining that one important factor in Turkey’s failure to
meet the Copenhagen criteria is that despite a framework for women’s rights and
gender equality, more efforts are necessary to actually realize those rights). See
Rachel Rebouché, The Substance of Substantive Equality: Gender Equality and
Turkey’s Headscarf Debate, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 713 (2009).
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vigorous implementation the judgements of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) by upgrading the “institutional framework
for promoting and enforcing human rights.”50
The Progress Report is harsh in describing the attitude of the
Turkish government towards minority rights in which “Turkey made
no progress on alignment with European standards.”51 The
Commission points to the restrictions on using other languages other
than Turkish in political life as well as in the media.52 Moreover,
minorities such as the Roma not only face a discriminatory treatment
in social protection and the employment context, but they also face
forced evictions in entire neighborhoods demolished by the
government.53 A similar problem exists in the southeast part of the
country with the Kurdish minorities. Here, according to the
Commission, the government needs to undertake further initiatives
“to create the conditions for the predominantly Kurdish population to
enjoy full rights and freedoms.”54
There, however, some critical considerations on both the
procedure and the substance of the Progress Report. The type of
scrutiny that the Commission exercises every year in its reports
prompts the question of whether it is relevant to assess the
discriminatory treatment of minorities such as Roma in Turkey.
Especially when in the rest of the European Union such a minority
has not encountered much better treatment. Recently a few cases
before the ECtHR against Greece and the Czech Republic have
condemned these countries for the discriminatory treatment of Roma
children in relation to education.55 In this respect, commentators have
50. Id. at 61.
51. Id. at 62.
52. Id.; see also Turkey 2008 Progress Report, supra note 3, at 24-26
(explaining that government-imposed restrictions “make broadcasting in languages
other than Turkish cumbersome and non-viable commercially”).
53. Enlargement Strategy 2008-09, supra note 44, at 62; Turkey 2008 Progress
Report, supra note 3, at 26.
54. Enlargement Strategy 2008-09, supra note 44, at 62.
55. See Affaire Sampanis et Autres c. Grèce [Sampanis and others v. Greece],
No. 32526/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 5, 2008), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/
viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
&key=71025&sessionId=21453468&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true; D.H. and
others v. Czech Republic, No. 57325/00, ¶¶ 205-210 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 13,
2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69
A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=22598&sessionId=21453680&sk
in=hudoc-en&attachment=true (finding that the establishment of a separate
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pointed out a paradoxical consequence of compliance with the
accession criteria and the Commission’s strict scrutiny, which occurs
only before, rather than after E.U. accession. For example, Bruno de
Witte and Gabriel Toggenburg said that perhaps “accession will lead
to a reduction of the European human rights standards for the
candidate countries, and could therefore lead to a reduction of their
actual respect for human rights.”56
Even if this scenario appears rather extreme the scrutiny of human
rights prompts to another question. If, according to the Commission,
the economic criteria are more in tune than the political and human
rights ones with the conditions of accession set up by the European
Union, the latter seem also less objective and more open to
manipulation. Not surprisingly, the Commission Report’s detailed
scrutiny of the democratic conditions and the situations that could
lead to human rights violations in Turkey has been widely
commented upon as an “excuse for resisting Turkey’s membership,
while the ‘real’ reasons could be traced to various political
considerations.”57 Human rights violations and the discriminatory
treatment of minorities have been the reason used over and over by
the European Union to postpone Turkish accession in a way that
seems to conceal deeper political and cultural problems, such as the
geography, the large population, and the dominance of Islam in
Turkey.

B. THE SMOOTHER PATH OF THE TRADE REGIME
Even though Turkey undertook numerous reforms toward
democratization, and the trade regime between the European Union
and Turkey is fully operative, the long and tortuous path towards
education system for Roma children had resulted in de facto segregation and
discrimination).
56. See Bruno de Witte and Gabriel N. Toggenburg, Human Rights and
Membership of the European Union, in THE EUROPEAN UNION CHARTER OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 59, 69 (Steve Peers & Angela Ward eds., 2004)
(suggesting that this might be a potential problem “for those matters which,
although duly examined in the human rights sections of the pre-accession reports,
are not evidently within the scope of EC internal competence, such as: the rights of
children, prison conditions and minority protection”). The authors further theorize
that “the EU institutions will suddenly have to cease being interested in minority
protection in Latvia, children’s rights in Romania and prison conditions in the
Czech Republic, once these countries have joined the EU.” Id.
57. Kassimeris & Tsoumpanou, supra note 18, at 339.
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membership is far from coming to an end. The Commission
announced several times that the negotiation process would be openended.58 Despite the uncertainty about the Turkish accession, trade
between the Union and Turkey has continuously expanded over
time.59 The Commission’s website states that the European Union
and Turkey “enjoy a deep trade relationship” and that the Union is
“number one in both Turkey’s imports and exports while Turkey
ranks 7th in the [European Union]’s top import and 5th in export
markets.”60 Finally, in the 2008 Progress Report, the Commission
states that the European Community-Turkey Customs Union
contributes increasing bilateral trade that has reached nearly 100
billion Euros in 2006 and made Turkey one of the European Union’s
major trading partners.61
From 1996 until today, however, the Customs Union has created
very disparate effects for its two partners.62 The free movement of
workers and services provisions incorporated in the Ankara
Association Agreement and its Protocol have been interpreted by the
ECJ in a way that created generous distributive effects for Turkish
workers in the European Union.63 Once Turks leave their home state
58. See EurActiv.com, EU-Turkey Relations, http://www.euractiv.com/en/
enlargement/eu-turkey-relations/article-129678 (last visited Mar. 28, 2009)
(positing that the even though the “underlying and shared objective” of Turkey’s
negotiating talks is accession, the ultimate outcome of accession is not
guaranteed).
59. For instance, since the creation of the Customs Union, it reached 75 billion
Euros in 2005. See Council of the European Union, Association with Turkey –
Establishment of the Position of the European Union for the 45th Association
Council Meeting (Luxembourg, 12 June 2006), at 31, available at
http://www.tobb.org.tr/abm/mevzuatvedokumanlar/st10324_en06.doc (observing
some “unfulfilled commitments” by Turkey that hamper the success of the E.U.Turkey Customs Union).
60. See European Commission, Bilateral Trade Relations: Turkey,
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/turkey/index_en.htm (last visited
Mar. 28, 2009).
61. Turkey 2008 Progress Report, supra note 3, at 5.
62. Some scholars have shown that this customs regime has been more
beneficial to the EU than to Turkey. See CHRIS RUMFORD, EUROPEAN COHESION?
CONTRADICTIONS IN EU INTEGRATION 94, 105-06 (2000) (explaining that the presingle market phase tends to “promote concentrations of development in the
already prosperous areas of the EU” and “exacerbate divergent standards of
living”).
63. See Edgar Lenski, Turkey and the EU: On the Road to Nowhere?, 63
HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 77, 84-85 (2003) (summarizing developments following
the implementation of the Ankara Agreement’s free movement of workers
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and become labor migrants in Europe, the Member States cannot
discriminate against them and therefore exclude them from the same
employment and other social security benefits granted to their own
nationals. In this respect, Turkish migrant workers have won a
number of salient legal battles on European soil. Since the 1990s the
ECJ has recognized a number of individual rights for Turkish
migrants derived directly from the provisions of the Ankara
Association Agreement, its Protocol, and the decisions of the
Council of Association.64 Thus, the status of Turkish migrants today
is more privileged than that of any other third country national in the
European Union. The Ankara Agreement has played a significant
role in favoring the integration of Turkish workers and their families
through easier access to residency permits and other employment
benefits in Europe.
By contrast, the European Union sets up cross-border projects and
pre-accession redistributive schemes to support the economies of
non-member countries. While Turkey has been a member of the
Customs Union since 1996, it has never had access to such preaccession financial aid or other forms of cooperation projects.65
While other countries entering customs unions with the EU benefited
from the European Community cohesion policy strategies, Turkey
did not.66 Cohesion policies consist of financial support that is
allocated to prepare the new members to cope with the pressures of
the European competitive trade regime, high volume of imports, and
market deregulation. In this respect, Chris Rumford highlighted that
the attitude of the European Union toward Turkey has been highly
contradictory:
Turkey, via the Customs Union, has been accepted as an
economic partner in the single market, but at the same time is
excluded from the range of projects that are designed to
underpin the common market . . . . Expanding the common

provisions).
64. Id.
65. See RUMFORD, supra note 63, at 93 (maintaining that “Turkey is excluded
from almost all the EU projects that are designed to facilitate the economic
integration of non-member countries”).
66. See id. (“The funds allocated to pre-accession are dwarfed by the Cohesion
Fund payments to existing members.”).
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market does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with enlarging
the [European Union].67
When compared to the aid that the Eastern European countries
received prior to the 2004 enlargement, Turkey has borne most of the
costs rather than shared in the benefits of European economic
integration by never entering the pre-accession category.68 As
Rumford emphasizes:
The most striking feature of the cross-border initiatives . . . is
the systematic exclusion of Turkey from almost all of
them. . . . The exclusion of Turkey is more significant
following the introduction of the Customs Union which
underpins Turkey’s economic bond with the EU, and which
confers upon Turkey a degree of economic integration
matched by no other non-member country.69
Lately, however, this much criticized disparate regime has come to
an end. In 2007 the European Commission approved its new strategy
of E.U. financial assistance for the period 2007-2009 through the
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance.70 During this period
Turkey, together with other countries seeking accession, would
receive funding from the European Union to promote democratic and
economic development on its path to E.U. membership. According to
the Commission, Turkey should receive about 1.602 billion Euros
from Brussels through a two-year program geared to strengthen
market and political institutions.71
67. Id.
68. See id. at 107-08 (explaining that “pre-accession is a far more flexible and
beneficial stage of membership” because pre-accession countries “have a clear
perspective of membership” and “pre-accession includes participation in a wide
range of EU initiatives . . . which assist with preparations for full membership”).
69. Id. at 106.
70. Commission Decision on a Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document
(MIPD) 2007-2009 for Turkey, C (2007) 1835 (Apr. 30, 2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/mipd_turkey_2007_2009_en.pdf.
71. See id. at 16 (allocating the total assistance for institution building, crossborder cooperation, regional and rural development, and human resources
development); see also Press Release, European Comm’n, European Commission
Completes Multi-Annual Planning of Financial Assistance to the Candidate and
Potential Candidate Countries (June 20, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/856 (pointing out that the EU’s
assistance to Turkey focuses on building strong institutions that will foster respect
for human rights and the rule of law). For instance, in 2008 the Commission
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C. LEGAL TRANSPLANTS AND SOCIAL BACKLASH
The relationship between Turkey and Western Europe can be
traced back at least to the Ottoman Empire. This long relationship
shows how the legal arena is an important ground for furthering
cooperation and channeling deep cultural and political struggles. In
the late nineteenth century, Turkey became a borrower of legal
models from Europe.72 The transplant of legal regimes, and in
particular of civil codes, was a welcome activity performed by legal
elites, having a clear modernizing agenda initially for the Ottoman
Empire and later for the Turkish Republic under Atatürk.73 Legal
elites borrowing European codes and legislative models aimed to
place their country in conversation with Western jurists in Germany
and France. At the same time, however, they sought to retain their
own cultural and political autonomy from Western legal influences
in areas that were not connected to the market. For example, in the
realm of family law, comparative lawyers have shown how the legal
transplant of the Swiss civil code to modernize Turkish family law in
the 1920s created legal mismatches.74
adopted for the period 2008-2010 an Instrument for Pre-Accession for Turkey that
will provide approximately 540 million Euros in financial assistance. Turkey 2008
Progress Report, supra note 3, at 5.
72. See BERNARD LEWIS, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN TURKEY 109-10 (2d
ed. 1968) (explaining that the early Turkish commercial code was based almost
entirely on French law); see also NIYAZI BERKES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
SECULARISM IN TURKEY 160-69 (1964) (observing that Turkey’s commercial
relations with outsiders necessitated the adoption of a commercial code).
73. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 98 (2d ed. 1993) (suggesting that even fixed areas of Turkish
private law, such as family law, were modernized as a result of foreign influence);
Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 441, 451 (Mathias Reimann &
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) (recognizing the modernization of the Turkish
law as a conscious choice made by the government despite resistance from the
majority of the population); see generally Pier Giuseppe Monateri, The ‘Weak
Law’: Contaminations and Legal Cultures, GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES, Issue 3 –
2001, art. 5, at 21, available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/advances/vol1/iss3/art5
(providing an overview of transplants and suggesting that “the practice of
borrowings has always been a normal practice”), Duncan Kennedy, The
Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought in THE NEW LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (suggesting that
the practice of borrowings in the first globalization operated differently with
respect to the market or the family).
74. See Ruth A. Miller, The Ottoman and Islamic Substratum of Turkey’s Swiss
Civil Code, 11 J. ISLAMIC STUD. 335, 335-36 (2000) (attributing the success of the
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The most recent example of legal transplant in Turkey results from
the pressure that Brussels places on Turkish legal and political elites
to adopt the acquis communautaire to harmonize Turkish law with
E.U. standards.75 Unlike the nineteenth century, today Turkish legal
elites are under pressure from supranational actors; Brussels and
Strasbourg have played a major role in the Turkish government’s
adoption of E.U. law and respect of the European Convention of
Human Rights (ECHR). Despite their Herculean harmonization
efforts, Turkish politicians and lawyers have received contradictory
signals from Brussels, the E.U. Courts in Luxembourg, and the
ECtHR in Strasbourg.76 On one hand, the denial of E.U. membership
has frustrated the efforts of the Turkish legal elites who have been
struggling to adopt directives harmonizing their market to E.U. legal
standards; on the other hand, the ECHR has upheld several Turkish
policies, such as the ban on headscarves in Universities, that appear
incompatible with the country’s effort to democratize.77 In this
respect, Brussels seems to espouse the analysis of Samuel
Issacharoff, who defined Turkey as a “fragile” democracy.78 Even
though the Turkish government successfully shattered and dissolved
the elected Islamic Welfare Party, the ECtHR legitimized this

Swiss Code in Turkey to a loose translation of its contents, which allowed for a
better fit between the Code and the society to which it was applied); Esin Örücü,
Turkey: Reconciling Traditional Society and Secular Demands, 26 J. FAM. L. 221,
233-35 (1987-88) (suggesting further upgrades to the Turkish family law but
recognizing that the Turkish courts have modernized the Civil Code through liberal
interpretation).
75. See European Commission – Enlargement, How Does a Country Join the
EU?, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how
_does_a_country_join_the_eu/negotiations_croatia_turkey/index_en.htm
(last
visited Mar. 28, 2009) (demonstrating that in order for Turkey to join the EU, it
needs to prove, among other things, its ability to “effectively apply and implement
the acquis,” and explaining the content of the aquis communautaire).
76. See Yeğinsü, supra note 37, at 18-25 (exploring the contradictory messages
that the Commission in Brussels and the ECHR in Strasbourg have been sending to
Turkey regarding human rights standards).
77. See Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 109, ¶¶ 165-66
(2005) (upholding a ban on Islamic headscarves at Istanbul University because it
was instituted “to preserve the secular nature of educational institutions”).
78. See Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405,
1444-47 (2007) (reflecting on the decision of Turkey’s Constitutional Court
dissolving the Welfare party for its anti-secular position).
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behavior that would otherwise be considered dangerous for any other
Western democratic regime.79
The human rights saga is only part of what has triggered a major
backlash among the Turkish elites, who have expressed soaring
frustration with accession to the European Union. While accession
requires an enormous effort to incorporate the acquis
communautaire, the Turkish political and legal elites who undertook
this effort received little recognition.80 As commentators put it,
despite this long and burdensome process, Turkey is the “longeststanding applicant to join the Community . . . [and] it is the longeststanding of those who remain frustrated.”81
Generally, the narrative of enlargement often has been presented
as the path for accession countries to seek membership in the
exclusive club of Western democracies.82 Thus, there is an exclusive
benefit for new members rather than for the European Union. Many
commentators, however, have portrayed an alternative narrative of
accession. They have highlighted gains not only for the new
members, but in particular for the Union in requiring unilateral
economic and political reforms without committing to grant
membership. In writing about the Eastern European enlargement,
scholars have noted the gains for the European Union and its longterm members: “They have gained industrial free trade without
making a commitment to grant membership. Unless membership
comes quickly, there will be a significant negative symmetry for
most of the less developed associate countries after 2001.”83 Despite
the implicit gains of expanding its markets and its political and
security borders, the European Union nevertheless can dictate
unilaterally the rules of accession. Thus, “at the time when the
79. See Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 269,
¶ 135 (2003) (justifying the dissolution of the Welfare Party as arising out of
“pressing social need”).
80. Ian Ward, The Culture of Enlargement, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 199, 212-22
(2005-06) (underscoring the EU’s distrust towards Turkey’s progress and
describing Turkish politicians’ frustration with the EU).
81. Id. at 208.
82. See Kennedy, supra note 21, at 376-78 (suggesting that accession to the EU
has become an “all or nothing proposition,” under which partial assimilation with
the EU is insufficient).
83. ANDRÁS INOTAI, What is Novel About Eastern Enlargement of the
European Union?, in ON THE WAY: HUNGARY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 11, 1718 (1998).
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[Central and Eastern European countries] were coping with the task
of satisfying a set of Copenhagen accession criteria and had opened
their economies to [E.U.] businesses, there was no formal obligation
from the European Union side to accept new members . . . .”84 In
other words, these scholars clarified that enlargement was not only
beneficial for candidate countries, but was also highly beneficial to
the European Union.85
Critical narratives about E.U. enlargement, underlining the
benefits that the Union gains from its new members, have been
largely overlooked by scholarship and the public opinion. In fact,
mainstream narratives have highlighted the gains for the new
members and the generosity of the European Union towards them.
These mainstream narratives helped to legitimize the asymmetrical
power between the Union and its aspiring members during the
accession negotiation. Thus, the European Union can freely set the
conditions for accession while not committing to grant membership
to those countries that already undertook the path towards full
membership by transplanting and harmonizing legal regimes and
committing to trade as well as political obligations.

II. YEDAŞ TARIM AND PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL:
THE TRADE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TURKEY
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. RELIANCE ON THE ANKARA ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT
In Yedaş Tarim, a Turkish company manufacturing ball bearings
and importing spare parts for agricultural and automotive industry
sued the EC for damages resulting from the manner in which the
Customs Union was implemented between the EC and Turkey from
1996 to 2003.86 In particular, the lifting of customs duties, which
increased imports in Turkey, created a negative impact on Yedaş

84. GAĻINA ŽUKOVA, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRADE IN GOODS BETWEEN THE
AND ITS CANDIDATE STATES: THE CASE OF LATVIA 21 (2004).

EU

85. Id. at 23 (explaining that enlargement “is very much about EU gains, a fact
which is very often forgotten in the western perception of the accession of
[E]astern Europe countries to the EU”).
86. Case T-367/03, Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v. Council
of the European Union, 2006 E.C.R. II-873, ¶ 20.
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Tarim’s commercial activities.87 In pursuing compensation through
damages under Article 288 EC, the plaintiff complained that the
Community never gave the financial support promised in the Ankara
Association Agreement, and it failed to comply with its obligations
towards Turkey.88 With respect to the causal link between the loss
suffered and the unlawful conduct of the EC, the applicant claimed
that the Customs Union had a negative effect on the Turkish
economy as a whole and that while its production suffered losses, its
imports were also damaged by the intense competition of cheap
quality goods entering the Customs Union from the Far East.89
The Court of First Instance rejected Yedaş Tarim’s claim by
holding that the case did not present unlawful conduct of the EC
since “the case-law requires that there must be established a
sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights
on individuals.”90 With regard to the provisions of the Ankara
Agreement, the CFI held, by referring to Demirel, that those
provisions were to be considered as “programmatic in nature.”
Consequently, the Court ruled out that such provisions would have
direct effect on the appellant’s situation.91 As to the Financial
Protocol, the Court held that the applicant did not state what
provisions conferred an individual right on Yedaş Tarim.92 Further,
the Court found no EC declarations with a promise to grant 2.5
billion Euros to Turkey when entering the Customs Union.93 The CFI
held that only the Preamble of the 1970 Additional Protocol provided
that “mutual and balanced obligations” should be undertaken by both
parties.94 This, according to the Court, was only a programmatic
obligation from which direct effect could not be derived.95

87. Id. ¶ 24.
88. Id. ¶ 22.
89. Id. ¶¶ 23-24.
90. Id. ¶ 35 (citing, among others, the well-known state liability case, Joined
Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland).
91. See id. ¶¶ 39-42 (concluding that because the Ankara agreement did not
provide detailed rules for carrying out its goals but was later supplemented by the
Additional Protocol, it did not have direct effect on the applicant).
92. Id. ¶ 45.
93. Id. ¶ 46.
94. Id. ¶ 49 (finding preamble language does not create legal obligations).
95. Id. ¶¶ 42, 49 (arguing, essentially, that the agreement is not sufficiently
precise and unconditional and, therefore, does not confer rights on individuals).
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The CFI textualist interpretation is surprising when compared to
the generous interpretation of the ECJ in establishing the direct
applicability of the decisions of the Council of Association in the
case of the free movement of Turkish migrants in the European
Union.96 Similar to its free movement decisions addressing Turkish
workers, the CFI could have adopted in this case a teleological
interpretation supporting the applicant’s claims.97 Rather than
focusing on the text of the agreement, a teleological interpretation
requires an evaluation of the goals of the ongoing relationship
between the EC and Turkey beginning at the time of the Ankara
Agreement. In establishing the unlawfulness of the conduct of the
Community, the Court could evaluate the meaning of unlawfulness
in the context of the European Union’s ongoing promises to Turkey.
The contractual relationship between the parties, who entered into
several international treaties by means of the Ankara Agreement and
its protocols, also created a reliance interest in Turkey insofar as both
parties committed, through long negotiations, international
agreements, and diplomatic relations, to “promote the continuous and
balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the
Parties, while taking full account of the need to ensure an accelerated
development of the Turkish economy and to improve the level of
employment and the living conditions of the Turkish people.”98
In international law the doctrine of estoppel has been adopted, not
without difficulties, in cases in which the behavior of Country A has
led Country B to believe that it would engage in a certain action, and
therefore Country B relied on a future action.99 In a well-known case,
96. See Bulent Cicekli, Legal Integration of Turkish Immigrants under the
Turkish-EU Association Law, TURKISH WKLY, http://www.turkishweekly.net/
article/22/legal-integration-of-turkish-immigrants-under-the-turkish-eu-association
-law.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2009) (arguing the Court’s approach evidences an
attempt to realistically balance migrant worker’s expectations and Member States’
national interests in immigration).
97. See Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van
Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, 1963 E.C.R. 1
(propounding that in order to determine whether treaty provisions have direct
effect, courts must consider not only the wording, but also the spirit and the
general scheme of the treaty).
98. Ankara Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2(1).
99. See JAN KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9394 (1996) (explaining that the doctrine of estoppel is usually “applied in situations
of law-application rather than law making”); I. C. MacGibbon, Estoppel In
International Law, 7 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 468, 512-13 (1958) (acknowledging that
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the International Court of Justice (ICJ) adopted the doctrine of
estoppel by holding that, due to Thailand’s behavior, Cambodia was
led to believe that it had accepted a particular territorial
delimitation.100 When Thailand tried to challenge this territorial
delimitation, which included land of great religious salience for both
countries on the Cambodian side of the border, the ICJ held that
Thailand’s conduct had induced Cambodia to rely on it by accepting
the new delimitation.101 In another well-known ICJ case, Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Co., Belgium sued Spain, seeking
reparation for damages caused to its nationals who were shareholders
of Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company and who were
damaged by the Spanish government’s actions towards the
company’s operations in Spain.102 After Belgium’s initial suit against
Spain, the parties entered into negotiations, and Belgium withdrew
its suit. When negotiations failed, Belgium tried to re-file the suit,
and Spain claimed that it was estopped from bringing the suit again
because Spain had relied on Belgium’s agreement to negotiate. The
ICJ rejected the notion that Spain had suffered some detriment
because, without Spain’s agreement to negotiate, the initial lawsuit
would have proceeded, and thus it found no estoppel.103 The ICJ
constructed the notion of estoppel narrowly by requiring a showing
of how Belgium induced Spain to act or to refrain from acting and a
showing of detriment suffered by Spain in relying upon Belgium’s
representations.104
some aspects of estoppel are in the process of becoming an international customary
norm).
100. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 33 (June
15).
101. See id. at 32-33 (deciding that Thailand had received and accepted the
territorial delimitation as evidenced by the country’s conduct); see also KLABBERS,
supra note 99, at 93-94 (using Temple of Preah Vihear to illustrate the application
of estoppel and to caution that “states may end up being estopped from acting
contrary to a non-legally binding agreement they concluded”) .
102. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1964 I.C.J. 6,
9 (July 24).
103. See id. at 24-25 (determining that Spain’s use of an estoppel argument to
attempt to preclude Belgium from re-bringing a claim that had been subject to a
discontinuance and failed negotiations did not show sufficient reliance or detriment
on Spain’s part to constitute an estoppel defense).
104. Christopher Brown, A Comparative and Critical Assessment of Estoppel in
International Law, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 369, 395-97 (1996) (discussing the
estoppel test applied by the Court and identifying it as a narrower version of
estoppel). See also Alfred J. Rubin, The International Legal Effects of Unilateral
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As the doctrine of the ICJ demonstrates, the doctrine of estoppel in
international law is far from being clear and uncontroversial. Several
commentators have traced its legitimacy back to its initial
development in English equity courts and its subsequent
Americanization with the American Law Institute’s adoption of the
famous Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts. Section 90 aimed
to fill the contractual gaps by expanding the range of binding
contracts through promissory estoppel.105 While establishing the
existence of the notion of estoppel in international law might not be
hard, scholars have often challenged its application as being a “wild
card” because, absent its common law restraints, estoppel could
allow “one who plays it in international law to make it represent any
legal notion he desires.”106
The fear of judicial manipulation of the doctine of estoppel seems
familiar in the European Union context. In Yedaş Tarim the E.U.
courts did not attempt to explore broad or narrow interpretations of
the estoppel doctrine; rather, the CFI remained completely deaf to
the claims made by the applicant. For instance, “the fact that the
entry into force of the Customs Union coincided approximately with
the reduction in the applicant’s profits [was not] sufficient to
establish a direct link between the facts complained of and the
damage alleged.”107 The Court implied that to satisfy the causal link
between the damages and the unlawful action of the EC, the
applicant could have prepared a more thorough economic assessment
to quantify the losses and to show that the costs of the Customs
Union outweighed the benefits that Turkey never received in the

Declaration, 1 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 16-17 (1977) (observing that the doctrine of
international estoppel was preceded by “estoppel” in Anglo-American law, and by
“‘preclusion’ or ‘forclusion’” in the civil law of Continental Europe).
105. See SPENCER BOWER, THE LAW RELATING TO ESTOPPEL BY
REPRESENTATION 514-16 (4th ed. 2004) (explaining that the American
interpretation of promissory estoppel, which first suggested that the theory could
be an independent source of obligations, is applied by American courts in such as
way that it did not lead to an expansion of the doctrine as many traditionalists had
feared); see generally 3 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 8.11
(Joseph M. Perillo ed., 1996) (providing an overview of the historical development
of promissory estoppel and noting that the doctrine was developed over five
centuries).
106. Brown, supra note 104, at 385.
107. Case T-367/03, Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v. Council
of the European Union, 2006 E.C.R. II-873, ¶ 59.
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form of financial aid.108 In its holding, the CFI turned one of the
conditions to assess the non-contractual liability into a sophisticated
economic quantification. However, without a particular
macroeconomic expertise, common law judges have been
quantifying the amount of the reliance interest by putting the plaintiff
in the position he was before entering into the contract, rather than
letting the plaintiff bear the costs of a “bad bargain.”109
In 1993, Yedaş Tarim started his investment in Turkey in reliance
on the fact that by entering into a Customs Union with the European
Union, Turkey would also be entitled to receive the benefits tied to
the future accession.110 Rather than investing in a Turkish business
for European exports, Yedaş Tarim could have targeted different
markets, differentiated its production, and developed more diverse
geographic ambitions. While the CFI addressed some of these
motives, either through an interpretation of the basis for creating
liability for the EC or by putting aside difficult quantifications, the
ECJ failed to reexamine Yedaş Tarim’s motives in the appeal. The
ECJ affirmed the decision of the CFI and dismissed the appeal by
finding most of the grounds of the appeal either manifestly
unfounded or inadmissible.111

108. Id. ¶¶ 58-59 (reasoning that an intervening factor could have instead caused
the loss of profits, “such as the structure of the Turkish market, the adaptation of
Yedaş Tarim’s competitors to the different markets in question, fluctuations of the
national currency and the conclusion of other trade agreements by Turkey”).
109. See Marc Owen, Some Aspects of the Recovery of Reliance Damages in the
Law of Contract, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 394-95 (1984) (noting that the
reliance damage approach, i.e., putting the plaintiff in the position he would have
been in had the contract been fully performed, is the conservative approach
towards damages).
110. See Yedas Tarim, 2006 E.C.R. II-873, ¶ 24 (detailing the company’s
investment decision “to invest in the production of ball bearings because domestic
production was . . . protected by a particular customs tariff”); see also RUMFORD,
supra note 63, at 93-94 (observing that while Turkey has been included in the
common market through the Customs Union, it has been “excluded from the range
of projects that are designed to underpin the common market”).
111. See Case C-255/06 P, Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v.
Council of the European Union, ¶¶ 41, 54, 59, 62, 65-66 (July 5, 2007), available
at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Rechercher&all
docs=alldocs&docj=docj&docop=docop&docor=docor&docjo=docjo&numaff=C255/06&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100.
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B. UNFULFILLED PROMISES: THE DETRIMENT FOR YEDAŞ TARIM
Having established the possibility of enforcing the promises made
by the European Union to Turkey through the doctrine of estoppel,
especially by assessing their ongoing relationship, this Part focuses
on two different sets of implications deriving from the promises
made to Turkey and never fulfilled by Brussels. A first set of
promises concerns the implicit benefits of a Customs Union between
Turkey and the European Union in light of the future Turkish
accession within a reasonable time. The second set of promises
concerns the financial aid package as well as other pre-accession
types of aid promised by Brussels to facilitate Turkey’s restructuring
its economy in light of its future E.U. membership. This Part
demonstrates that in relying on the promises made by the European
Union, there have been different kinds of detriments for Turkey.
The first set of promises made by Brussels concerns the Customs
Union that was created by Article 10 of the Ankara Agreement in
1963. In 1970 the Additional Protocol set the conditions to establish
a Customs Union and the transitional periods for its
implementation.112 In 1995 with Decision 1/95 of the EC-Turkey
Association Council the Customs Union entered the final phase of its
implementation requiring the abolition by both parties of import and
export customs duties.113 In this context, the European Union
promised that the Customs Union would strengthen the trade
relationship between the two entities.114 While the Customs Union
was implemented by Decision 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association
Council, its timetable extended until 2001. In Yedaş Tarim, the
claimant argued that Turkey suffered a number of financial losses
with the Customs Union’s entry into force. Because all the customs
duties were eliminated, the Turkish industry could not compete with
112. See Additional Protocol, supra note 15, art. 1.
113. EC-Turkey Association Council Decision 1/95, 1996 O.J. (L 35) 1, art. 4
[hereinafter Decision 1/95] (requiring also that both countries refrain from
imposing new tariffs).
114. See Nannette A.E.M. Neuwahl, The EU-Turkey Customs Union: A
Balance, but No Equilibrium, 4 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 37, 37-38 (1999) (stating
that EC-Turkey Association Council Decision 1/95 reaffirmed the significance of
the Ankara Agreement, “which provides for the accession of Turkey to the
European Community ‘as soon as the operation of the Agreement has advanced far
enough to justify full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations [entailed in
membership]’”).
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European products, and this resulted in huge losses for the Turkish
manufacturers. Likewise, Yedaş Tarim suffered large financial losses
at the time of the implementation of the Customs Union.115 Another
detriment for Turkey, rather than a benefit as promised by Brussels,
was the elimination of customs taxes so that Turkey had to increase
its value-added tax (VAT) rates to balance its budget. As a result,
Turkish citizens had to pay higher taxes, while the prices of goods
were increasing as a result of a less competitive economy when
compared to other E.U. Member States.116
In 1963, the Ankara Agreement was a compromise that the EEC
reached at the time in response to Turkey’s demand to become a
member of the EC.117 The Agreement consisted of a preliminary step
for accession, provided that Turkey met the democratic and
economic conditions of EU membership.118 Moreover, the Ankara
Agreement created a Customs Union which was not fully operative
until 1996 and even after then Turkish agricultural products were still
excluded from the Customs Union and limited by E.U. quotas.119
Despite such exclusion, for over twenty years Turkey has
restructured its agricultural policy to harmonize its standards with
those of the EC because “the Community promised to take into
account Turkish agricultural interests and speed of development in
this sector while adopting its own rules in this field.”120 However,
115. See Yedas Tarim, 2006 E.C.R. II-873, ¶ 23 (describing the applicant’s
claim that the Customs Union adversely affected the Turkish economy as a whole).
116. See Glenn W. Harrison, Thomas F. Rutherford & David G. Tarr, Economic
Implications for Turkey of a Customs Union with the European Union 3 (The
World Bank Int’l Econ. Dept., Working Paper No. 1599, 1996) (estimating
Turkey’s revenue loss from implementing the Customs Union at 1.4% of GDP and
forecasting that if Turkey decides to use the VAT to replace the lost revenues, then
“VAT rates will have to increase by 16.2% in each sector to compensate for the
revenue loss”).
117. See ŽUKOVA, supra note 84, at 38 (explaining that the objective of the
Ankara Agreement was to create an Association between the Parties that would
ultimately facilitate Turkish accession to the EC) .
118. See Ankara Agreement, supra note 8, art. 28 (“As soon as the operation of
this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by
Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the
Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the
Community.”).
119. RUMFORD, supra note 63, at 92-93 (noting that while agriculture is
excluded from the range of sectors included in the Customs Union, a 1998 farm
agreement has reduced the quotas for Turkish farm products).
120. ŽUKOVA, supra note 84, at 43.
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such promise was never fulfilled. Because of the failed Turkish
accession, agricultural products remained excluded from the
Customs Union, while Turkey had to cope with restructuring its
agricultural sector according to E.U. standards.121
In Yedaş Tarim, the damage that the applicant alleged is the
current “macroeconomic imbalance” created by the inadequate aid
that the EC gave to Turkey in the context of the Customs Union.122
During the first year of the Customs Union, Turkey’s imports from
the European Union increased significantly.123 However, this was not
the case for the Turkish exports to Europe, which did not increase as
expected but varied sector by sector.124 In 1996 the Commission
recognized such imbalance in imports and exports with Turkey, and
it noticed that its exports had doubled especially in the textile sector
where Turkey was losing its comparative advantage.125 Thus, the
Customs Union was a model of pre-accession integration that did not
prove very successful and that the European Union did not follow in
its subsequent negotiations. In this respect, Galina Žukova explains
that “once the Community has burnt its fingers by promising more
than it is actually willing to offer in practical terms, it does not make
the same mistake again.”126
The second detriment for Turkey stems from the promises made in
relation to the Financial Protocols to the Agreement. In Yedaş Tarim,
the ECJ found that the EC’s unilateral undertaking to grant Turkey
121. See RUMFORD, supra note 63, at 92-93 (noting that “not all sectors of the
Turkish economy are included in the Customs Union,” including agriculture, and
explaining that a 1998 farm agreement between the EU and Turkey does not
“amount to an extension of the single market” because processed agricultural
goods are still excluded).
122. See Case T-367/03, Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v.
Council of the European Union, 2006 E.C.R. II-873, ¶ 20 (summarizing the
applicant’s arguments).
123. RUMFORD, supra note 63, at 95 (reporting that “European Union exports to
Turkey increased from $15.8 billion in 1995 to $24 billion in 1997”).
124. See id. (showing a modest increase in Turkey’s exports to the EU);
ŽUKOVA, supra note 84, at 42 (comparing the growth of exports from Turkey to
the EU (4%) to the imports to Turkey from the EU (32.5%) during the first year);
see also Neuwahl, supra note 114, at 45-46 (attributing Turkey’s slower export
growth to the fact that most of Turkey’s exports were industrial or manufactured
goods, which have been exported to the EU without a customs tariff since 1971).
125. See ŽUKOVA, supra note 84, at 42 (reporting that the Commission took
notice that Turkey’s imports of clothing from the EU increased by 130% in 1996).
126. See id. at 44.
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financial help did not enter into force due to the veto of Greece in the
context of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.127 The financial
package was supposed to support Turkey in addressing the possible
detriment created by the Customs Union. The aim of the financial
package was to enable the Turkish government to offer short-term
financial aid to those sectors such as the textile industry that had
suffered from the trade liberalization created by the Customs
Union.128 When the applicant in Yedaş Tarim argued that the
Commission and the EC defaulted on their promises because they did
not take necessary steps to adopt the financial aid package, the Court
responded succinctly that the European Union was not accountable
for these actions.129 Rather, the applicant was not able to prove which
specific provisions of the financial protocols had been infringed.
Further, the CFI found that the provision of “reciprocal and balanced
obligations” between the parties was a vague commitment that did
not have direct effect, and in turn, it could not create liability for the
European Community.130
The Ankara Agreement set in place some financial aid to promote
economic and democratic developments in Turkey, but this was
consistently blocked by Greece until 1999 when the Commission
finally proposed a smaller package of aid.131 The Commission
adopted this modest package of financial aid because it classified
Turkey as a developing country, which did not require a unanimous
vote but rather a qualified majority in the Council, thus enabling the

127. See Case C-255/06 P, Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v.
Council of the European Union, ¶¶ 20, 50 (July 5, 2007), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Rechercher&alldoc
s=alldocs&docj=docj&docop=docop&docor=docor&docjo=docjo&numaff=C-255
/06&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100.
(relaying
the applicant’s allegations concerning Turkey’s deficit).
128. See Ankara Agreement, supra note 8, art. 3(1) (stating that “[d]uring the
preparatory stage Turkey shall, with aid from the Community, strengthen its
economy so as to enable it to fulfil [sic] the obligations which will devolve upon it
during the transitional and final stages”).
129. Case T-367/03, Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v. Council
of the European Union, 2006 E.C.R. II-873, ¶ 50.
130. See id. ¶¶ 42-49 (finding that provisions relied upon by the applicant were
insufficiently precise or unconditional to have direct effect in the applicant’s
situation).
131. Cf. Hugg, supra note 2, at 1326-28 (attributing improved relations between
Greece and Turkey to, among other things, the election of more moderate foreign
ministers in each country).
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Commission to circumvent the Greek veto.132 These facts support the
notion that in the long negotiation with the EU, Turkey relied on
receiving some benefits from a future accession to the EU that it did
not enjoy fully or timely.

III. THE CURRENT TRADE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
CREATED BY THE ANKARA ASSOCIATION
AGREEMENT AND ITS SUBSEQUENT PROTOCOL
This Part moves beyond the debate on the likelihood of Turkish
accession to the European Union, and instead focuses on the
significant economic and political consequences for Turkey
stemming from the Ankara Agreement. There is a steep imbalance in
the consequences of the free movement doctrines as interpreted by
the ECJ and in the alignment of Turkish commercial policy with that
of the European Union. Over time, the promise of Turkish accession
to the European Union has burdened Turkey much more than
Brussels, and has led to Ankara’s receiving fewer benefits than
anticipated.

A. REASSESSING THE UNBALANCED TURKEY-EUROPEAN UNION
TRADE RELATIONSHIP
With the signing of the Ankara Association Agreement in 1963
and the Additional Protocol in 1970, the European Community
created a large number of obligations for Turkey and rights for its
citizens with respect to the free movement of workers and services
and the freedom of establishment in the European Union.133 Over the
years, the ECJ has changed its jurisprudence in interpreting the right
132. See RUMFORD, supra note 63, at 95 (underscoring the importance of the aid
package to Turkey because it showed the EU would honor its Customs Union
commitments).
133. See Ankara Agreement, supra note 8; Additional Protocol, supra note 15.
Article 13 of the Association Agreement contains the following general provision
on the freedom of establishment between the Member States and Turkey: “The
Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 52 to 56 and Article 58 of the
Treaty establishing the Community for the purpose of abolishing restrictions on
freedom of establishment between them.” Article 41 of the Additional Protocol
provides as follows: “The Contracting Parties shall refrain from introducing
between themselves any new restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the
freedom to provide services.”
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of free movement and the right of establishment of Turkish migrant
workers and their families.134 In interpreting the Ankara Association
Agreement, the ECJ has strengthened those free movement rights for
Turkish nationals that are directly enforceable in European domestic
courts.135
Because of the Association Agreement, Turkish migrants benefit
from a different status in the European Union, especially when
compared to other third country nationals, with respect to work
permits, visa requirements and social security entitlements.136 Even
though the freedom of movement of workers and services and the
freedom of establishment are not yet unconditional rights for Turkish
nationals, they are entitled to benefit from whatever progress is made
towards the elimination of restrictions on these rights.137 However,
the favorable treatment of Turkish workers and their families has
triggered important distributive effects for E.U. Member States. In
fact, national welfare regimes are now under pressure, not only due
to the competition created by the internal market, but also because of
the extension of social benefits to Turkish immigrants, who have
been performing an increasingly significant share of low-skill jobs.138
The favorable treatment of Turkish migrants by the ECJ creates a
burden which impacts mostly the domestic social security schemes
of the Member States, rather than the almost non-existent E.U. social
policy.139
134. See Lenski, supra note 65, at 84-85 (noting deficiencies in the EU law on
the freedom of movement of Turkish workers and crediting the ECJ with
developing case law on the subject matter).
135. See id. (explaining the ECJ’s decisions that found that the Association
Council’s decisions implementing the Ankara Agreement conferred the free
movement rights to Turkish workers).
136. See Cicekli, supra note 96 (characterizing the EU’s general approach to the
issue of third country nationals’ treatment as host-nation centered and attributing
Turkish immigrants’ more favorable status to the Ankara Agreement).
137. See id. (noting that the right of establishment and the freedom to provide
services are not unconditional rights but acknowledging that the intra-European
freedom of movement has not yet been expanded to include third country
nationals). See generally CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE
EU: THE FOUR FREEDOMS (2007).
138. See Fritz W. Scharpf, The European Social Model: Coping with the
Challenges of Diversity, in INTEGRATION IN AN EXPANDING EUROPEAN UNION:
REASSESSING THE FUNDAMENTALS 109, 112-15 (J. H. H. Weiler, Iain Begg & John
Peterson eds., 2003) (explaining the competitive pressure that the EU places on the
domestic welfare regimes of the Member States).
139. See JEAN-CLAUDE BARBIER, LA LONGUE MARCHE VERS L'EUROPE SOCIALE
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With respect with the world trade effects of the Ankara
Agreement, this created a number of obligations for the Turkish
Republic because it required the country seeking E.U. membership to
gradually align itself to the European common commercial policy.140
This obligation has created numerous consequences for global trade,
in particular with respect to Turkey’s position in the WTO. Because
of Turkey’s restrictions on imports of textile and clothing products,
India has challenged the Turkish regulations as an infringement of
the WTO obligation.141 At the same time, complying with such
restrictions is an important obligation of the Turkey-European Union
Customs Union.142 Thus, the Ankara Agreement puts Turkey in a
double bind situation whereby in aligning itself with the E.U.
common commercial policy it violates the multilateral trade
obligations of the WTO, thus opening itself up to lawsuits by third
countries for such violations.

B. FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS AND SERVICES
The question of whether association agreements, similar to
international treaties signed by the EC, create an individual right that
is directly enforceable by domestic courts has been one of the central
jurisprudential debates in E.U. international relations.143 The ECJ
DE PARIS,

(PUF, coll. “Le lien social,” 2008).
140. Ankara Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4(1); see ŽUKOVA, supra note 84, at
38-40 (stressing that the Customs Union “implies inter alia a common commercial
policy” because Turkey is required, among other things, to harmonize its external
trade policies with those of the Community).
141. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing India’s complaint
against Turkey before the WTO).
142. See Panel Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing
Products, ¶¶ 9.141-9.149, 9.156, WT/DS34/R (May 31, 1999) [hereinafter WTO
Panel Report on Turkish Textiles] (considering Turkey’s argument that it had to
adopt exactly the same external trade policies as that of the Customs Union, but
ultimately concluding that Turkey had to bring its measures into conformity with
its WTO obligations); WTO Appellate Body Report on Turkish Textiles, supra note
7, ¶¶ 63-64 (upholding the Panel’s decision that Turkey needed to bring its trade
measures into conformity with their obligations under the WTO agreements).
143. See PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
MATERIALS 207 (4th ed. 2008) (remarking on the proliferation of academic
literature on the legal effects of international agreements in the EC legal order); see
also Gerhard Bebr, Agreements Concluded by the Community and Their Possible
Direct Effect: From International Fruit Company to Kupferberg, 20 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 35, 65-73 (1983) (addressing the potential implications of using the
direct effect rule, which allows European Community citizens to seek court
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was called upon to interpret the text of the Ankara Agreement and its
Additional Protocol to decide whether the right of free movement
conferred to Turkish workers, legally employed in the EC was
directly applicable.144 In Demirel the ECJ held that the Additional
Protocol and the Ankara Association Agreement, despite their
international nature, have become integral parts of the E.U. legal
system.145 The Court has referred to Article 12 of the Agreement that
expressly states that: “Contracting Parties agree to be guided by
Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the Treaty establishing the Community for
the purpose of progressively securing freedom of movement for
workers between them.”146 Article 36 of the Additional Protocol
guarantees: “Freedom of movement for workers between Member
States of the Community and Turkey shall be secured by progressive
stages . . . .”147 With these two provisions, Turkey and the EC were
clearly committed towards the progressive elimination of the
obstacles to free movement of goods, workers and services in their
commercial relationship. The various steps in the implementation of
such a commitment were to be taken through the decisions of the
Association Council, the institution established by the Agreement.

enforcement of European Community Treaty obligations, to interpret the effect of
an agreement concluded by the Community with a third State); see generally Steve
Peers, Fundamental Right or Political Whim? WTO Law and the European Court
of Justice, in THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 111
(Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2001) (presenting critiques of the ECJ’s
decisions that seemed to rule out the direct effect of WTO panel reports).
144. See Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schwabisch Gmund, 1987 E.C.R. 3719,
¶ 4; Cicekli, supra note 96 (articulating the ECJ’s conclusion in Demirel that
Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement and Article 36 of the Additional Protocol are
programmatic and are not “sufficiently precise and unconditional to be capable of
governing directly the movement of workers”).
145. See Demirel, 1987 E.C.R. 3719, ¶ 7 (declaring that “an agreement
concluded by the Council under Articles 228 and 238 of the Treaty is . . . an act of
one of the institutions of the Community . . . and, as from its entry into force, the
provisions of such an agreement form an integral part of the Community legal
system”).
146. Demirel, 1987 E.C.R. 3719, ¶ 19; Ankara Agreement, supra note 8, art. 12.
The new numbering of the Treaty of the European Union Articles corresponds to
the free movement of workers provisions included in articles 39, 40, and 50.
Moreover, the Ankara Agreement includes similar provisions on the freedom of
establishment and on the freedom to provide services in articles 13-14 of the
Agreement.
147. Additional Protocol, supra note 15, art. 36 .
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The question in Demirel was whether the provisions of the
Agreement and the Protocol had direct effect, thus granting directly
to Turkish citizens who were denied either working or residence
permits under Member States’ laws the rights protected by the E.U.
free movement provisions.148 When a provision is directly effective,
the supremacy of E.U. law mandates that national courts apply such
provision despite the fact that they could be in conflict with other
domestic rules.149 However, not every provision of an international
treaty or an association agreement stipulated by the EC is directly
applicable, and the ECJ has created a test to determine which
provisions have direct effect.150 This test establishes that the
provisions of an association agreement that have direct effect must
be clear and unconditional so that there is no need to adopt further
measures to implement them.151 These provisions also confer rights
to private individuals that should be directly enforceable by the
domestic courts of the Member States.152 In Demirel, the ECJ refused
to bestow direct effect on Article 12 of the Agreement and Article 36
of the Protocol because both provisions were not sufficiently precise
and unconditional to govern directly the free movement of workers
between Turkey and the EC.153

148. See Demirel, 1987 E.C.R. 2719, ¶ 14 (holding that a provision of the
Agreement is directly applicable when, “regard being had to its wording and the
purpose and nature of the agreement itself, the provision contains a clear and
precise obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the
adoption of any subsequent measure”).
149. See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585 (holding that
the EU court was not obliged to apply national law that conflicted with EU law
since EU law constitutes an “independent source of law” which cannot “be
overridden by domestic legal provisions”); see also Case 26/62, Algemene
Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands, 1963
E.C.R. 1 (establishing the EU’s legal principle of direct effect by ruling that
individual citizens under certain conditions could enforce in national courts their
Member State’s legal obligations pursuant to the state’s membership within the EU
Community); see generally CRAIG & BÚRCA, supra note 143, at 206-07
(summarizing the ECJ’s approach to the direct effect of international agreements).
150. See Algemene Transport, 1963 E.C.R. 1 (articulating the direct effect test
as asking whether the provision creates a clear and unconditional legal obligation
for an individual to enforce and whether the provision’s spirit and general scheme
reveal its intention to apply to, and be enforced by, individuals in state courts).
151. Id.
152. See id. (finding that direct effects of a treaty create “individual rights which
national courts must protect”).
153. Demirel, 1987 E.C.R. 2719, ¶ 23.
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Three years later, the ECJ changed its opinion in a slightly
different case interpreting a decision of the Council of Association
rather than articles of the Agreement or the Protocol. In Sevince, the
Court held that not only the Ankara Agreement itself but also the
decisions of the Council of Association form integral parts of E.U.
law.154 Mr. Sevince, a Turkish national employed for a number of
years in the Netherlands, applied for a residence permit and was
denied an extension of his permit.155 In support of his appeal, he cited
the provisions contained in two decisions of the Council of
Association.156 These provisions entitled a Turkish national who
belonged to the regular employment market for at least four years to
have free access to employment of his choosing.157 The ECJ had to
decide whether the decisions of the Council of Association had direct
applicability in the EC legal order.158 The Court held that some
provisions of the decisions of the Council of Association had direct
effect for Turkish nationals if they were clear, unconditional, and
directly applicable.159 In this case, the Netherlands opposed the
notion of direct applicability of the decisions based on the fact that
the decisions are conditional in nature and not precise enough
because they required national transposition into the domestic legal
regimes.160 In rejecting these arguments, the ECJ held that it had

154. Case C-192/89, Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1990 E.C.R. I3461, ¶ 9; see also TREVOR HARTLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW 224 (2007) (stating that the ECJ in Sevince “held that acts (decisions) adopted
by [councils of association under association agreements] can be directly effective
in the Community if they comply with the same requirements as apply to
agreements between the Community and non-Member States”).
155. Sevince, 1990 E.C.R. I-3461, ¶¶ 3-4.
156. Id. ¶ 4.
157. See id. (explaining that Article 2(1)(b) of Decision 2/76 provided that after
five years of legal employment in a Member State of the Community, a Turkish
worker shall “enjoy free access in that Member State to any paid employment of
his choice,” and that Article 6(1) of Decision 1/80 provided that a Turkish worker
who “duly register[s] as belonging to the labour force of a Member State is to
enjoy free access in that Member State to any paid employment of his choice after
four years’ legal employment”).
158. Id. ¶ 5(2).
159. See id. ¶¶ 14-15, 26 (setting forth criteria to judge whether the Council of
Association’s decisions that are at issue in this case have direct effect and deciding
in the affirmative).
160. See id. ¶ 22-23, 25 (replying implicitly to the Netherlands’ argument that
the decisions allowed national authorities to establish procedures for applying the
rights granted to Turkish workers and ruling that those provisions simply allowed
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previously permitted the execution of decisions without national
transposition.161 Moreover, the Court followed the opinion of
Advocate General Darmon, who argued that the purpose and nature
of these decisions ought to be appraised in light of the general aims
of the Agreement and the Protocol.162 Similar to international
agreements, the decisions of the Council of Association should be a
priori provisions that have direct applicability in the Member States
as long as they conform to the test adopted by the ECJ.163 The denial
of direct effect in in Demirel did not preclude the Court from finding
that some of the decisions of the Council of Association can have
direct effect.164
In following the Sevince precedent, the ECJ interpreted the
decisions of the Council of Association to allow Turkish migrants
legally employed in a Member State and their families to remain or
to switch employment in that state.165 In Kuş, the ECJ held that
Member States to promulgate necessary administrative procedures for the
implementation of the decisions and did not empower them “to make conditional
or restrict the application of the precise and unconditional right which the decisions
of the Council of Association grant to Turkish workers”); see also KEES JAN
KUILWIJK, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE GATT DILEMMA: PUBLIC
INTEREST VERSUS INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS? 119 (1996) (detailing the Dutch
government’s argument that the safeguard clauses in the Association Council’s
Decisions “gave the contracting parties a unilateral power of derogation”).
161. See Sevince, 1990 E.C.R. I-3461, ¶ 25 (citing Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt
Mainz v. Kupferberg, 1982 E.C.R. 3641) (responding to Netherlands’ argument
that the decisions allowed the contracting parties to derogate from provisions on
the rights of Turkish workers and finding that the decisions permitted derogation
only in specific situations, and the existence of such clauses did not affect the
direct effect test).
162. See id. ¶¶ 19-20 (discussing the purpose and nature of the decisions and the
Ankara Agreement); see also KUILWIJK, supra note 160, at 119 (detailing how
General Darmon distinguished precedent from the circumstances of the Sevince
case).
163. Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
164. Id. ¶ 21.
165. See, e.g., Case C-237/91, Kazım Kuş v. Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden, 1992
E.C.R. I-6781, ¶¶ 26, 36 (ruling that a Turkish worker who has worked within a
Member State for the same employer under a valid work permit for more than one
year is entitled to a renewal of his work and residence permits); Case C-355/93,
Hayriye Eroğlu v. Land Baden-Württemberg, 1994 E.C.R. I-5113, ¶ 23 (allowing a
Turkish national, who meets the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 7
of Decision 1/80, to obtain an extension of his residence permit); Case C-434/93,
Ahmet Bozkurt v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1995 E.C.R. I-1475, ¶¶ 10, 42
(reciting the Council of Association’s Decision 1/80 as granting Turkish nationals
the general right to remain employed or switch employment within a Member
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Turkish migrants legally employed in the EU for at least one year
have the right to remain in that employment and can rely on Article
6(1) of the Council Decision 1/80 to extend their work permits.166
Mr. Kuş was a Turkish national who obtained a permit to reside in
Germany by virtue of his marriage.167 By the time he had to renew
his residence permit, he had recently divorced his German wife.168 In
interpreting article 6(1) of Decision 1/80 of the Council of
Association, the ECJ held that under certain conditions Mr. Kuş was
entitled to renew his working permit.169 In a more recent case, the
ECJ held that Mr. Ergat, a Turkish national who had been refused
permission to extend his German residence permit, could rely on
Article 7 of Decision 1/80 to extend his permit.170 Mr. Ergat joined
his parents, who were legally employed Turkish migrants in
Germany, at the age of eight and enjoyed a right of residence for the
purpose of reuniting his family.171 Being a resident of Germany for
more than five consecutive years, the ECJ held that states cannot
attach conditions to the residence of a member of a Turkish worker’s
family after he has been cohabitating for three years with his parents;
rather, he is entitled to enter the labor market in the host state.172
Finally, in 2008 the ECJ revisited the saga of the Turkish workers
with another case concerning the renewal of a working permit for an
State, but rejecting a Turkish national’s ability to remain in-state if he or she is
rendered permanently incapacitated for work); Case C-340/97, Ömer Nazlı et al. v.
Stadt Nürnberg, 2000 E.C.R. I-957, ¶¶ 49, 64 (finding that Article 6(1) of Decision
1/80’s work and residence rights for Turkish nationals are not lost upon a
temporary break in work); Case C-188/00, Bülent Kurz, né Yüce v. Land BadenWürttemberg, 2002 E.C.R. I-10691, ¶ 61 (holding that a Turkish national who
entered a Member State on a student visa and subsequently stayed to undergo
vocational training with an employer is a worker within the meaning of Article
6(1) of the Council of Association Decision 1/80); Joined Cases C-317/01 & C369/01, Eran Abatay & Nadi Sahin v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 2003 E.C.R. I12301, ¶ 117 (agreeing generally that Decision 1/80 of the Association Council
allows Turkish nationals rights, under certain conditions, to remain employed and
residents of Member States).
166. Kazım Kuş, 1992 E.C.R. I-6781, ¶ 26.
167. Id. ¶ 3.
168. Id. ¶ 4.
169. Id. ¶ 26 (declaring that Mr. Kuş was entitled to a renewal of his work
permit even if his marriage had dissolved, so long as he “has worked there for
more than one year for the same employer under a valid work permit”).
170. Case C-329/97, Ergat v. Stadt Ulm, 2000 E.C.R. I-1487, ¶ 67.
171. Id. ¶¶ 27-28.
172. Id. ¶¶ 38-40.
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au pair, Ms. Payir, and two students, Mr. Akyuz and Mr. Ozturk,
who were employed in part-time jobs while conducting their studies
in the United Kingdom.173 In interpreting Article 6(1) of Decision
1/80, the ECJ held that its precedents showed that the aim of this
provision was to “consolidate progressively the position of Turkish
workers in the host Member State.”174 The fact that the applicants
entered the host state as an au pair or as students did not deprive
them of the status of workers. Because they were legally employed in
the United Kingdom, they enjoyed the protection of Article 6(1),
which entitled them to obtain a renewal of their working permits
together with residency for one year.175
The ECJ did not shy away in adjudicating even more controversial
questions that entailed important distributive effects for welfare
regimes of the host states where Turkish workers and their families
were residing. According to Article 10(1) of the Council of
Association’s Decision 1/80, Member States cannot discriminate
against legally-employed Turkish migrant workers on the basis of
nationality with respect to their pay and other working conditions.176
In interpreting this provision, the ECJ held that Article 10(1) of
Decision 1/80 has direct effect by conferring on Turkish migrants
and their families the right to enforce non-discrimination provisions
in the courts of the host state.177 Similarly, the Court held that
Decision 3/80 of the Council of Association, which prohibited
Member States from discriminating against non-nationals in the
distribution of state welfare, had direct effect, and individuals could
enforce it in national courts.178 Mrs. Sürül reunited with her husband,
a student who was entitled to work sixteen hours per week, and she
held an accessory residence permit entitling her to live in
Germany.179 When Mrs. Sürül gave birth to a child, she was entitled
173. See Case C-294/06, Payir v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 2008 ECJ
EUR-Lex LEXIS 2271, ¶¶ 9, 13, 14.
174. Id. ¶ 37 (citing Case C-230/03, Mehmet Sedef v. Freie und Hansestadt
Hamburg, 2006 E.C.R. I-157, ¶ 34).
175. Id. ¶ 49.
176. See Case C-171/01, Wahlergruppe ‘Gemeinsam Zajedno/Birlikte
Alternative und Grune GewerkschafterInnen/UG’, 2003 E.C.R. I-4301, ¶ 16
(quoting Article 10(1)).
177. Id. ¶¶ 57, 67.
178. Case C-262/96, Sema Surul v. Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, 1999 E.C.R. I2685, ¶¶ 96-98.
179. Id. ¶¶ 35-38.
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to receive a state allowance for taking care of the infant.180 In 1993,
the German government paid Mrs. Sürül both a family and a low
income allowance, which ended in 1994 because she did not possess
a standard residence permit.181 The ECJ held that a Turkish national
authorized to enter the German territory to reunite her family must
receive from the host state the same social security benefits that
German residents are entitled to by state law.182 In denying the family
allowance to Mrs. Sürül based on the lack of a standard residence
permit, the ECJ held that the government was discriminating against
a Turkish national because German law required no such document
of German nationals.183
The Council of Association was supposed to implement the
progressive abolition of restrictions on the freedoms of movement of
services and establishment.184 While neither freedom has been fully
achieved in the current trade regime between Turkey and the
European Union, a standstill provision in the Additional Protocol
requires that Member States refrain from implementing additional
restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to
provide services.185 This means that the restrictions that were in place
at the time of the Agreement will remain valid, whereas new
restrictions on these freedoms will be unlawful because the baseline
of the Agreement established that Turkey and the EEC committed to
move forward towards the progressive elimination of any restriction
on these freedoms.186
The ECJ has interpreted the freedom of establishment and the
freedom to provide services in a way that prevents Member States
from introducing new restrictions on Turkish workers’ ability to
establish themselves in the European Union to provide and receive
services.187 In Tum and Dari, two Turkish nationals, Mr. Veli Tum

180. Id. ¶ 40.
181. Id. ¶¶ 41-42.
182. Id. ¶ 98.
183. Id. ¶ 103.
184. See Additional Protocol, supra note 15, art. 41(2).
185. Id. art. 41(1).
186. Id.
187. See Joined Cases C-317/01 & C-369/01, Eran Abatay & Nadi Sahin v.
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 2003 E.C.R. I-12301, ¶ 117 (prohibiting Member States
from introducing restrictions unless they were enacted prior to the entry into force
of the Additional Protocol).
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and Mr. Mehmet Dari, were denied admission to the United
Kingdom to start their own businesses.188 In their appeal, the Turkish
nationals claimed that their immigration petition should be examined
in light of the standstill provision included in Article 41(1) of the
Additional Protocol.189 The ECJ held that this provision had direct
effect, but it did not confer directly a right of establishment to the
Turkish nationals.190 However, the Court held that Article 41(1)
precluded the United Kingdom from adopting any new provision that
would create stricter conditions for the establishment of a Turkish
national in its territory than the ones already in place at the time of
the Agreement.191 Recently, in Mehmet Soysal, the ECJ went even
further in holding that no visa requirement was necessary in the case
of a Turkish national who entered the territory of a Member State in
order to provide a service on behalf of a Turkish company.192 This
judgment received wide attention by both Turkish and E.U. officials
interested in monitoring the ECJ judgment that voided the German
visa requirement for a Turkish truck-driver.193
To understand the bigger picture emerging from the ECJ
jurisprudence in the Turkish migrant workers’ cases, one ought to
link this jurisprudence to the European Union-Turkey trade
relationship and the Yedaş Tarim decision. Both sets of decisions are
relevant to understand a complex trade relationship because they
clearly belong to the same macroeconomic strategy. There are those
Turkish citizens who, by remaining at home have to cope with the
increasing annual foreign trade and fiscal deficit after the
implementation of the Customs Union.194 In this situation Turks did
188. Case C-16/05, Veli Tum & Mehmet Dari v. Sec’y of State for the Home
Dep’t., 2007 E.C.R. I-07415, ¶ 29.
189. Id. ¶ 30.
190. See id. ¶¶ 46, 52, 55 (explaining the procedural nature of Article 41(1) and
concluding that it does not, in itself, confer rights of entry or establishment upon
Turkish citizens).
191. Id. ¶ 49.
192. See Case C- 228/06, Mehmet Soysal, Ibrahim Savatli v. Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, Judgment of 19 February 2009.
193 See Turkey’s Chief E.U. Negotiator on ECJ’s Visa Decision, TIMETURK
ENGLISH, available at http://en.timeturk.com/turkeys-chief-eu-negotiator-on-ecjsvisa-decision-16039-haberi.html (last visited May 18, 2009).
194. See ROBERT LEONARDI, COHESION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE
BUILDING OF EUROPE 159 (2005) (depicting the recent economic situation in
Turkey as being “out of control with very high annual deficits” and also studying
other newly integrating countries’ economic situations).

2009]

PROMISES OF ACCESSION

779

not benefit from the Ankara Agreement where they chose to invest in
a company that was put out of business by the fact that cheaper,
high-quality goods arrived from Europe through the Customs Union,
while cheaper, lower quality ones arrived from Asia through the
WTO Free Trade regime. In either case, Turkish businesses were
under the severe competitive pressure of regional and global trade
without enjoying the benefits of E.U. membership.
But at the same time, those Turks who migrated to seek lowincome jobs in the European Union benefited from the advantages
offered by national welfare states. As to the Turkish migrants in
Germany, the fact that they increasingly gained access to
employment and social welfare benefits shows that Turkish workers
took numerous lower income jobs during the 1980s and 1990s,
before unskilled labor flooded the European Union from former
Eastern European countries.195 The expansion of welfare benefits to
Turkish immigrants through the ECJ jurisprudence put more pressure
on E.U. Member States that were increasingly cutting back on
welfare benefits. However, the ECJ jurisprudence indirectly created
incentives for Turks and their families to seek low-income jobs in
Western Europe.

C. WTO OBLIGATIONS FOR TURKEY
The new obligations undertaken by Turkey in the aftermath of the
entry into force of the Customs Union with the EC change Turkey’s
relationship with other members of the WTO and players in the
global trade arena. Turkey became a member of the original General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1951, which created a
multilateral trading system until the entry in force of the WTO in
1995.196 The WTO embodies multilateral obligations among trading
195. UTA SAUMWEBER-MEYER & HANS DIETRICH VON LOEFFELHOLZ, FED.
OFFICE FOR MIGRATION & REFUGEES (F.R.G.), IMMIGRATION OF FOREIGNERS TO
GERMANY: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION AND LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION WITH
PARTICULAR RESPECT OF TURKISH MIGRANTS 3 (Feb. 19-21, 2006), available at
http://migration.uni-konstanz.de/content/center/events/de/events/mexico2006/Sau
mweber_v.Loeffelholz.pdf (reporting that a substantial part of the Turkish
population in Germany is still low-skilled).
196. See, e.g., World Trade Organization, The 128 Countries That Had Signed
GATT by 1994, http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/gattmem_e.htm (last
visited Mar. 29, 2009) (providing a list of signatories to the GATT and when each
member joined); World Trade Organization, The General Agreement on Trade in
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countries, and its core principle is the Most-Favoured-Nations
clause.197 This provision requires trade to be conducted on the basis
of non-discrimination, and all the members are bound to give each
other a treatment in tariffs and trade that is as favorable as the
treatment received by any other member of the WTO.198
In 1995, Turkey notified the WTO when it was about to reach the
final stage of implementing its Customs Union with the EC by means
of a Decision of the Council of Association.199 However, specific
provisions of this Decision required Turkey to align its foreign
commercial policy to EC policies regulating the import of textiles
and clothing.200 India challenged these provisions in the WTO
dispute settlement body because it claimed that Turkey was
infringing multilateral obligations by creating new quantitative
restrictions through the Customs Union without formally acceding to
the European Union.201 Turkey responded that the same complaint
should have been brought against the EC as well, even though India
insisted that the Community was not accountable for the trade
measure adopted by Turkey.202 The WTO Panel decided that because
the Turkey-EC Customs Union was not a member of the WTO, this
dispute could not be subject to its dispute settlement procedures.203
Despite Turkey’s obligations stemming from the Customs Union
with the EC, the Panel condemned Turkey for the infringement of its
Services
(GATS):
Objectives,
Coverage
and
Disciplines,
¶
9,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm (last visited Mar. 29,
2009) [hereinafter WTO Objectives] (stating that the WTO entered into force
January 1, 1995).
197. See WTO Objectives, supra note 196, ¶ 7 (listing the Most Favored Nation
principle as a general obligation that applies “directly and automatically to all
Members and services sectors”).
198. See id. (summarizing Members’ obligations).
199. See Decision 1/95, supra note 113, art. 1 (declaring that the purpose of
Decision 1/95 is to articulate the rules “for implementing the final phase of the
Customs Union”); WTO Panel Report on Turkish Textiles, supra note 143, ¶ 2.17
(noting that Turkey notified the WTO on December 22, 1995 in accordance with
Article XXIV of GATT).
200. See Decision 1/95, supra note 113, art. 12(2) (mandating Turkey to “apply
as from the entry into force of this Decision, substantially the same commercial
policy as the Community in the textile sector including the agreements or
arrangements on trade in textile and clothing”).
201. See WTO Panel Report on Turkish Textiles, supra note 142, ¶¶ 2.35-2.36,
3.35 (discussing India’s objections to Turkey’s obligations under Decision 1/95).
202. Id. ¶ 3.33.
203. Id. ¶¶ 8.3, 9.6.
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obligations under the WTO.204 Further, the Appellate Body upheld
the finding of the Panel because Turkey did not show that, without
implementing the obligations mandated by the Decision of the
Council of Association, its access to the EC Customs Union would
have been impossible.205
As Galina Žucova explained in this case, “Turkey was heavily
relying on participation of the EC as a ‘third party,’ following India’s
refusal to bring the claim against two co-respondents. However, the
EC took a clear stance that it will not participate in the case in either
status, a decision which very seriously undermined [the] Turkish
position.”206 The Turkish Textiles case demonstrates that the
Customs Union created burdensome obligations for Turkey while the
European Union continuously lacked accountability.

CONCLUSION
The unbalanced trade relationship between Turkey and the
European Union described in this Article remains one of the most
significant causes of the backlash among Turkish legal and political
elites over the constant refusals of E.U. membership. In this
perspective, it is not surprising that the Turkish lawyers drafting the
plaintiff’s brief in Yedaş Tarim pointed blame at the longstanding,
asymmetrical Turkey-European Union trade relationship. In the
realm of the Customs Union, the accession of Turkey created
burdensome obligations for the country. Further, because of the
provisions on free movement stemming from the Association
Agreement, Turkish migrant workers in Europe are entitled to a full
protection of their right to free movement in the common market in
the same way as E.U. citizens because the lower income jobs they
are performing are essential to Western European societies.
However, when Turkish nationals are local entrepreneurs at home,
they are reminded that they are not E.U. members, and they have no
204. See id. ¶¶ 9.44, 9.207-.208 (finding that Turkey’s quantitative restrictions
imposed on nineteen categories of textile imports from India violated its
obligations under the GATT).
205. See WTO Appellate Body Report on Turkish Textiles, supra note 7, ¶¶ 58,
62-63 (finding that because alternative measures were available to Turkey that
would have satisfied all of its obligations, Turkey’s decision to implement the
quantitative restrictions at issue is not excused under Article XXIV of GATT, and
therefore the restrictions are not justified).
206. ŽUKOVA, supra note 84, at 282.
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reason to rely on such privileges. Yedaş Tarim, a Turkish company
relying on Turkey’s future accession to the European Union for its
business, could not recover the damages created by the fact that the
Turkish economy and balance of trade worsened rather than
improved in the aftermath of the EC Customs Union.
This Article suggests understanding the Yedaş Tarim litigation as a
response to the disappointment of the Turkish elites, especially the
ones who were most committed to Turkish membership in the
European Union. Even though the CFI and the ECJ departed from
using the doctrine of promissory estoppel as suggested by the
plaintiff to create liability for the European Union in favor of Turkey,
this case points to the asymmetrical trade relationship between the
two parties. While the Luxembourg Courts might not be the most
appropriate fora to clarify the costs and benefits of the E.U.-Turkey
trade relationship, but in Yedaş Tarim, the Courts lost a chance to
assess the existence of major imbalances created by the obligations
in the overall trade regime between Turkey and the European Union.
By focusing on the reasons of the Turkish distrust towards Brussels,
Yedaş Tarim marks an important shift of perspective towards the
current debate on Turkish membership to the European Union. In
this respect, this Article suggests reassessing macroeconomic
implications created by the Ankara Agreement, the Customs Union,
and the promises of accession by Brussels vis à vis Turkish legal and
political elites, local businesses, and immigrant workers in the
European Union.

